Although the aviation industry is increasingly becoming important for Africa's economic development and integration, the ability of airlines to access foreign markets remains hindered by restrictive regulatory policies. Attempts have been made to fully liberalize the intra-African air transport market. Except for general assertions about the merits/demerits of liberalization, our empirical understanding of the welfare effects of such polices in Africa remains rudimentary. This study empirically measures the economic effects of air transport liberalization, mainly on two supply side variables: fare and service quality, measured as departure frequency. The results show up to 40 % increase in departure frequency in routes that experienced some type of liberalization compared to those governed by restrictive bilateral air service agreements. While the effect of liberalization is substantial in improving service quality, there is no evidence of its fare reducing effect. 
Introduction
For many African countries, air transport is a vital corridor for international passenger and freight flows. The presence of an efficient air transport service increases the economic competitiveness of African countries by facilitating access to the world market and enhancing regional integration. It also eases labor mobility and tourism. While the virtues of air transport are widely known, non-physical barriers continue to impede air transport service expansion between African countries. These barriers mainly stem from restrictive regulatory arrangements which dictate how the service is rendered. Owing to this trade-deterring impact of restrictive regimes, there has been a general move toward liberalization in the world. Although the YD is full of promise, its implementation has not been satisfactory.
A major implementation challenge has been the lack of adequate knowledge on the economic effects of the full implementation of the YD. Will full liberalization of the intra-African air transport market lead to an improvement in service quality and reduction in fares? Or will it result in the disappearance of smaller airlines and abuse of market power by big airlines?
In order to fully implement the YD, these questions have to be thoroughly analyzed. Except for general beliefs and assertions by policy makers and airlines on the merits/demerits of liberalization, so far there have been very limited empirical studies try to systematically evaluate these questions.
The current paper makes important contributions by systematically assessing the economic effects of liberalizing intra-Africa air transport, contributing to a small but growing literature. The results show an increase of up to 40% in departure frequency in routes that experienced some type of liberalization compared to those governed by restrictive bilateral arrangements.
Furthermore, there is a greater increase in departure frequency in routes which experienced partial liberalization compared to fully liberalized ones. By contrast, analysis of the effect of liberalization on air fare did not result in a statistically significant effect, which rules out welfare gains from reduced fares. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the airline industry in Africa and its regulatory context; Section 3 and Section 4 present the empirical model and the data; Section 5 presents the main findings; and Section 6 concludes and provides policy implications of the main findings.
2 The airline industry in Africa and its regulation: a brief overview
African airlines
The air transport sub-sector in Africa is full of contradictions. There are a number of conditions which could make the aviation industry thrive in the continent. Africa's population size (1.1 billion) and large landmass (30.2 ml km2) presents a favorable environment for the air transport The prospects of the African air transport industry are relatively promising. According to Boeing's estimates, a robust international passenger annual growth rate of 6.6% is expected in the 2011 to 2031 period in Africa, well above the previous long-term industry average rate of 5% (Boeing, 2012 ). This forecast is based on sustained GDP growth, the rise of the African middle-class consumer, and urbanization. 3 To promote the realization of this optimistic outlook, it is crucial to put in place the right set of regulatory regimes that foster a productive aviation industry with the participation of African airlines.
The regulatory context of the intra-African air transport market
As in many international industries, airline industry regulation has shifted toward liberalization. This shift had its beginning when the US deregulated its domestic market in the late 1970s.
Subsequently, the US started to follow a liberal 'Open Skies' policy in its air transport services negotiations with the rest of the world. 4 In 1993, the EU also created a single market in which 2 A case in point, Lufthansa, which flies to 35 African destinations, owns 672 aircraft (Lufthansa Group, 2013 ).
3 It has been shown that growth in GDP explains about two-thirds of air travel growth (ATAG, 2004) . 4 The 'Open Skies' policy refers to airline markets where there is little or no regulation of activities that restrict competition. It could be applied to a bilateral agreement, in which there are no capacity, entry or price regulations on the airlines of the bilateral partners that do, or might, serve the route. Such agreements will typically allow for more competition between the airlines of the partner countries and they make more trade possible (Forsyth, pp. 56, 2001 ).
member countries' airlines are given freedom of establishment, market access, capacity and tariff (fare) fixing for air transport within its borders.
In Africa, a similar continent-wide package is the 'Yamoussoukro Decision' (YD), which was adopted in 1999 by heads of states to progressively open air transport within the continent.
The YD was expected to progressively eliminate all non-physical barriers relating to granting of traffic rights, particularly fifth traffic rights; aircraft capacity; tariff regulation; designation of airlines; and air freight operations (UNECA, 2002). According to Article 7 of the decision, provisions of the YD take precedence over all previous BASAs signed between African countries.
The practice so far, however, has been that individual countries negotiate bilaterally based on the YD provisions. Hence, each country has control of the pace and extent of its air transport market openness. 5 Currently, most international air transport services in Africa are conducted under the web of bilateral agreements that put restrictions on entry (market access), capacity (frequency and aircraft type), and foreign ownership of airlines. In addition, traffic rights, airline designation and fares are also subject to restrictive regulatory control. These agreements are based on a reciprocal exchange of rights, which are intended to be exploited by the designated airlines of bilateral partners. 
Demand model
A standard air transport demand model includes own price (fare) and service quality as the main explanatory variables (Schipper et al, 2002; Dresner and Tretheway, 1992) . It also includes 'gravity equation' variables such as the population and GDP of the origin and destination countries of a trip, and the distance between them. 8 The first two are 'generative' variables that capture a catchment area for potential travelers, whereas distance is an 'impedance' variable because social and economic interactions between countries tend to decline with it. 7 Baltagi et al. (1995) view the route structure effects of liberal policies as the most remarkable of all. This is due to the fact that air transport is a network industry. Thus, having flexibility in terms of route selection, frequency of operation and aircraft capacity choice allows an airline to operate in the most efficient network. Accordingly, a reduced form model for air passenger demand for route r in period t is given as:
where pass rt is the number of round-trip passengers carried in route r during year t;
f are/km rt is the roundtrip economy fare; f req rt is the number of frequency; income rt and pop rt are the product of the per capita income and population size of the route endpoint countries; and dist rt is the great circle distance between airports of the route endpoints in km.
All the variables are in logs, allowing the coefficient estimates to be interpreted as elasticity.
The inclusion of fare in the passenger demand equation is justified for obvious reasons. The usage of standard economy fare, however, disregards the fact that airlines offer various fares depending on the type of traveler (e.g. business or leisure). If possible, the lowest available fare should be used to study the response of demand to fare level changes. This is because it is more likely that a change in the lowest fare affects air travel decisions, compared to other fare classes (Mallebiau and Hansen, 1995 9 Because Addis Ababa is the common end-point of all the routes in the sample, only the population and the income of countries at the other end of a route are considered. 10 We expect these two 'generative' variables to have a positive effect on demand, while distance, the 'impedance' variable, is expected to have a negative effect.
The fare and frequency variables pose an endogeneity problem because of their simultaneous determination with demand (the dependent variable). For instance, a higher traffic flow between two cities may lead to realization of economies of traffic density, 11 which lowers the average cost and ultimately leads to a lower fare. There is, therefore, a feedback effect from the lefthand-side variable, 'pass', to the fare level. As for frequency, airlines are likely to adjust their departure frequencies as a response to an increase in demand, again reversing the causality maintained in our specification. Jorge-Calderon (1997) and Schipper et al. (2002) show that frequency has a positive effect on demand. However, only the latter accounts for the endogeneity of frequency and fare in the demand equation. We follow a similar empirical strategy by Schipper et al. (2002) and estimate separate fare and frequency models.
9 Nero (1998) justifies usage of economy class fares by arguing that they are more linked to costs than other fare categories which are determined as either a 'mark-up' or a 'discount' on economy fare. 10 This is a common approach in the literature; ,see, for example, Oum et al (1993) 
Frequency model
The departure frequency model is specified as:
where Furthermore, an increase in the number of airlines in a given route implies a higher departure frequency as airlines compete to make suitable service available to consumers.
Accordingly, we expect 'operators' to have a positive coefficient. Finally, distance and aircraft size are expected to have a negative effect on frequency. Distance is a major 'impedance'
variable that forces departure frequency to decrease. Operating a larger aircraft (i.e., increasing the number of seats per flight) effectively results in a decline in total departure frequency.
In the econometric framework outlined in this section, the fare and frequency variables are assumed to be endogenous in the demand equation. There are several suggestions in the literature to handle this endogeneity problem. 13 The most appropriate methodology to tackle the problem is a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation in a panel data setting, suggested by
Dresner and Tretheway (1992) and Schipper et al. (2002) . We employ a similar 2SLS procedure.
Although the demand, fare and frequency models can be solved simultaneously, each will be estimated separately using a 2SLS. Doing so allows us to gain interesting insights into the effects of the parameters in each equation since they have important economic interpretations (Nero, 1998; Marin, 1995) .
Data
The The data include all passengers who traveled to/from Addis Ababa, regardless of their origin or final destination, whereas the fare and departure frequency variables apply only to the city-pair routes. The fare data was gathered from the Official Airline Guide (OAG, 2007).
13 Marin (1995) Table 3 summarizes the provisions of Ethiopia's BASAs that are relevant to our sample routes. Table 4 presents results from a 2SLS random effects passenger demand model (E.q.1). 15 The endogenous fare and frequency variables are instrumented by the two liberalization dummies, 'libf' and 'libp', the number of operators and cost variable. 16 The coefficient of fare is significant at the 10 % level, and its values suggest that the demand for the city-pair routes is price 15 The unobserved effects should be tested to check whether they are fixed or random, depending on their relationship to the explanatory variables. Accordingly, we applied the Hausman specification test to contrast the null hypothesis Ho: corr ( rt , X) = 0 (random effects model) against the alternative H1: corr ( rt , X) 0 (fixed effects model). We failed to reject the null hypothesis, confirming that the random effects model is appropriate. A Wooldridge (2002) auto-correlation test for panel data was also conducted to test for the presence of first order auto-correlation (AR (1)). Results from this test indicates that, for all of the three models, the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is rejected. 16 See Appendix 2 for details of how the cost variable is calculated.
Results
inelastic. 17 This fare in-sensitivity of air transport demand is expected, given the type of travelers in Africa. The low income levels across the continent imply that air transport is still a luxury service yet to be enjoyed by the masses, which in turn implies that air travelers in The number of passengers has a positive and significant effect. This result confirms the hypothesis that African airlines face a short-run capacity constraint, which implies that, in the event of excess demand, they probably tend to increase fare levels to ration seats or capitalize on short-run demand surges. We also note that, in both models, distance has the expected negative sign and is highly significant at the 1% level. 19 The negative sign indicates the presence of economies of flight length, which accrue to airlines as fixed costs per flight (take-off and landing costs) are distributed over a longer distance (see the scatter plot of fare/km against distance in Figure 2 that illustrates this relationship).
The main variables of interest in the fare model are the two liberalization dummy variables.
We see in Model 1 that full liberalization has a negative effect on fare, significant at the 10% level. This result is in line with the hypothesis that a liberalized market arrangement leads to a lower fare. In contrast, partial liberalization appears to be insignificant in both 17 Interestingly, it is in the range for business traveler's elasticity documented by Oum et al (1992) . They report the range 0.65 -1.15 as the most common for business travelers. 18 The urban population variable will be used as an instrument for passengers in the subsequent models because it is highly significant (at the 1% level). 19 A strong and significant negative correlation (-0.9836) between distance and cost is observed; therefore, the cost variable is dropped from the estimation. models, although it has the expected negative sign. We note that the coefficients of the two liberalization dummy variables are insignificant in Model 2. Because Model 1 does not take time specific effects into account, the effect of full liberalization could have been overestimated.
Inclusion of the year dummies in Model 2 ensures that unobserved time effects are not absorbed by the liberalization coefficients.
The disparity of the significance level of the full liberalization variable between the two models poses a dilemma as to which model to choose. We opt for the conservative specification, Model 2. This is because in the sample period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , and even in later years, there were few channels through which liberalization policies could reduce fare levels, for our sample in particular and in the African air transport market in general. Previous studies on other aviation markets find that liberalization policies lead to lower fare levels as a result of increased competition between existing and/or new airlines in a post-liberalization period. 20 To attest the validity of these findings in the context of the African market, we need to answer two basic questions. First, did liberalization bring about entry of new airlines? Second, were fares strictly regulated in the pre-liberalization period, such that any decline in fare after liberalization can be attributed to the regulatory change?
A closer look at our sample sheds light on these questions. Firstly, although multiple designations of airlines were allowed under liberalized BASAs, there were no new entries of airlines. As a result, the incumbent airlines were not under any pressure to decrease fares. In fact, Ethiopian Airlines was the sole operator in almost 75% of the city-pair routes. Given such a high level of market dominance (and partly due to the airline's good reputation), an appealing argument is that the airline was charging a monopoly markup, which effectively rules out the fare decreasing effect of liberalization policies. However, our empirical findings, particularly the negative coefficient of the two liberalization dummies, suggest otherwise.
Secondly, consultation with industry experts revealed that fare levels were not regulated even in routes governed by restrictive BASA. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that a decline in fare levels as a result of liberalization policies, given that fare levels were not set based on the regulatory regimes. did not result in a statistically significant effect, which rules out welfare gains from reduced 22 Ethiopian airlines' load factor in its intra-African routes was 65% on average during the sample period. As per the prediction of the model, part of any increase in passenger number was accommodated by filling empty seats rather than by a significant increase in departure frequency. 23 As expected, both have a positive effect on departure frequency. A move from restrictive bilateral regimes to either full or partial liberalization allows airlines to increase departure frequency to meet growing demand and/or to deliver services tailored to the needs of consumers. However, the case for demand increase as a result of a decline in fare level is ruled out because our fare model did not predict a statistically significant impact of liberalization policy. Therefore, possible positive impact of the two liberalization variables comes from the open arrangement, which enables airlines to exploit fifth traffic rights to sustain more frequency. 24 The percentage values are calculated as 100*(e 0.38) and 100* (1-e 0.35) for partially and fully liberalized routes, respectively. In sum, the results of this study provide important new insights into the economic effects of liberalization policies in Africa. The main policy recommendation of this study is liberalization of restrictive service frequency provisions. Doing so will help airlines provide flexible services.
In the long run, this also has the potential to elicit competition between African airlines, which would reduce fares. It has been proven in other regions of the world that every country should not necessarily own an airline to reap the benefits of an efficient air transport service. To the extent that liberalization fosters the aviation industry, many African countries could continue to be both players and beneficiaries of the industry by introducing more competition. 
